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Linger Honors Thesis 1
Analysis of the Police Response to Mass Shootings in the United States between 1966 and 2016
Abstract
This study examines 186 mass shooting events for the protocol police followed upon arrival atthe 
scene. In 124 of these cases, the police arrived on scene after the shooter had stoppedshooting, 
either because the shooter committed suicide, fled the scene or was detained by people in the area 
who were not currently police officers. Of the 186, only 62 cases included police arriving on 
scene and following a response protocol, either engagement or perimeter. Thenumber of 
casualties varied for each incident and type of police response. These cases were analyzed to 
determine if one type of response protocol was more effective in decreasing the number of 
casualties resulting from a shooting. Analysis of the data showed signs that suggested there are 
more casualties when the perimeter protocol is followed, but these results remain statistically 
insignificant. However, indirect support for the effectiveness of the engagement protocol 
reducing the number of casualties included a significant correlation between the shooting 
duration and the total number of casualties.  
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Analysis of the Police Response to Mass Shootings in the United States 
between 1966 and 2016 
 
One mass shooting many people are familiar with is the 1999 Columbine High School 
shooting, which killed 12 students and one teacher and injured 24 students (Erickson, 2001). 
This event was a pivotal point in police response to mass shootings. Since the Columbine High 
School shooting, the police protocol for shooting events has changed in many jurisdictions from 
the perimeter protocol to an engagement protocol (Blair, Nichols, Burns & Curnutt, 2013). When 
following a perimeter protocol, the first responding officers create a perimeter and wait for 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) or other tactical teams. When following an engagement 
protocol, contact teams made of the first responding officers engage or neutralize the shooter as 
quickly as possible (Blair et al., 2013). This change was instituted in some jurisdictions because 
it was believed that an engagement protocol would decrease the number of casualties resulting 
from a mass shooting.  
Due to these different police response protocols and the random and unpredictable 
application of each, each protocol needs to be studied to determine which leads to fewer 
casualties. This calls for an evaluation of the statistical relationship between the type of police 
response and the number of casualties from mass shooting events. This analysis can then be used 
to determine if there is a police response that is most effective in limiting the number of civilians, 
law enforcement officers, and collaborating agency members who become casualties. 
 Although the Columbine shooting inspired a change in a police response protocol, not all 
police departments follow the engagement protocol. A very recent example of perimeter protocol 
occurred on February 14, 2018 in Parkland, Florida during a shooting at Stoneman Douglas High 
School, where 17 people were killed and 15 were injured (Burch & Mazzei, 2018; Earl & 
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Schallhorn, 2018; Almukhtar, Lai, Singhvi & Yourish, 2018). At 2:19pm, a shooter entered the 
school and used smoke grenades to set off fire alarms, so that people would leave their 
classrooms (Almukhtar et al., 2018; Burch & Mazzei, 2018). While students were attempting to 
leave the building because of the fire alarm, the shooter opened fire in hallways, five classrooms, 
and the stairwell, where he left his rifle, ammunition, and vest (Almukhtar et al., 2018). Once 
these items were abandoned, the shooter managed to escape the building in a crowd of others 
leaving the scene before he was arrested at 3:41pm walking down a street a few miles from the 
school (Burch & Mazzei, 2018; Almukhtar et al., 2018). The police were seen standing outside, 
surrounding the building as students ran out (Almukhtar et al., 2018). This included the School 
Resource Officer, who did not engage the shooter, but waited outside the building and ordered 
responding officers to shut down the street in front of the school (Flores et al., 2018). Many 
officers were ordered to stay at least 500 feet away from the building (Flores et al., 2018). 
Additionally, as the Broward County Sheriff’s supervisor arrived on scene, he asked if a 
perimeter had been set up, but was told it had not yet been completed (Flores et al., 2018). 
A less recent, but just as relevant mass shooting that illustrates this incomplete change in 
protocols is the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, which left 58 people dead and over 546 
others injured (United States Secret Service [USSS], 2018). Initially police officers responded 
and tracked down the shooter to his hotel room at approximately 10:24pm, but the police then 
waited for SWAT officers to engage the shooter (Almukhtar et al., 2017). When the SWAT 
officers entered the hotel suite to engage the shooter around 11:20pm, they found that the shooter 
had already committed suicide, likely around 10:25pm (Almukhtar et al., 2017). Although it is 
estimated that the shooter committed suicide shortly after his location was determined, it took 
SWAT approximately 75 minutes to mobilize and enter the hotel suite, which is far longer than 
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the 20-minute response time by some SWAT teams (Los Angeles Times Staff, 2018; Blair & 
Martaindale, 2013). Due to the delay in SWAT response, many more lives could have been at 
risk, as was the case during the Columbine and Parkland shootings, if SWAT and police officers 
were unaware the shooter was no longer active. SWAT and the police department’s 
understanding of the status of the shooter by the time SWAT entered the room remains unknown 
to the public. 
These are only two examples of mass shootings (at least three people killed or physically 
injured) within the last year, but there are many others. Mass shootings and active shooter events 
(ASEs) have become more prevalent in recent years, but there are only a few databases that track 
the number of mass shootings, which include the Gun Violence Archive (n.d.) and the Mass 
Shooting Tracker (2013). Others, such as the Stanford Mass Shootings in America (MSA) 
database and the Gun Violence Archive track the number of the casualties that result from the 
shootings included in their database. According to the Gun Violence Archive, there were 384 
mass shootings in the US within 2016, which has largely increased from the two known mass 
shootings that occurred in the US within 1966 (Jeffrey, 2018; MSA, 2012). Between 1966 and 
2016, there have been over 1,000 mass shootings in the US, with at least 986 occurring between 
2014 and 2016 (Gun Violence Archive, n.d.; Mass Shooting Tracker, 2013).  
Before the Columbine shooting, law enforcement officers were trained to create a 
perimeter around the location so the shooter could not escape, evacuate those who could easily 
be evacuated, establish communications, and to call SWAT to neutralize the shooter (Blair et al., 
2013; Smith & Delaney, 2013). These steps were summarized as five c’s: “contain, control, call 
SWAT, communicate with the perpetrator, and come up with a tentative plan” (Smith & 
Delaney, 2013). After Columbine, law enforcement protocols changed to emphasize creating 
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groups of two to four police officers as small contact teams who would attempt to end the 
shooting by killing or apprehending the shooter (Smith & Delaney, 2013); a switch to an active 
rather than a passive response. The intent of the change in active shooter response protocol is to 
reduce casualties, however, little research has examined whether this has occurred (Blair et al., 
2013). 
Literature Review 
Prior research in this area has considered the roles of first responders during ASEs and 
mass shootings as well as how communities are becoming more aware of their role in the 
response to such events. Additional research discusses the background and psychological profiles 
of shooters, and how these can be used to improve threat assessments. The common 
characteristics of previous shootings have also become more widely available. 
Within the first responder community, each entity has a different role to play when 
responding to these events. The role of law enforcement officers has been considered in terms of 
their response times to a shooting, the actions they take upon their arrival at a scene, and the 
training programs some officers go through in order to respond more efficiently (Ergenbright & 
Hubbard, 2012; Iselin & Smith, 2009; Martínez, 2012). Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) 
reviewed 12 shootings in the US and determined that the amount of time it takes police to 
respond to the scene has a large impact on the number of casualties. They also found that the 
average police response time exceeds the average shooting duration by about six minutes 
(Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012). Other articles consider the impact of law enforcement once they 
arrive on scene, including Iselin and Smith’s (2009) study which considered the paradigm 
change in police response from perimeter protocol to engagement protocol. Similarly, Martínez 
(2012) looked at the training programs that have developed around this protocol change and 
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determined that officers who are trained to engage the shooter through these programs are more 
likely to decrease the number of casualties resulting from an ASE. However, none of these 
articles or ones similar to them (Dusek, 2013; Mazer, Thompson, Cherry, Russell, Payne, Kirby 
& Pfohl, 2015; Hodgins & Saliba, 2015; Kotora, Clancy, Manzon, Malik, Louden & Merlin, 
2014; Lankford, 2015; Challis, 2010), considered police response times for mass shootings, the 
change in protocol, or the effect this protocol change had on the number of casualties, they 
instead focused on the way an individual should respond during mass shootings. 
In a parallel development to police protocols, there have also been changes considered 
and implemented in some areas to the Fire/Rescue with Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 
capabilities and EMS roles in the response to shootings. Previously, these groups were expected 
to wait until SWAT units or other responding police officers considered the scene clear and safe 
for those with EMS capabilities to enter in order to triage and minimally treat victims (Iselin & 
Smith, 2009). This has changed in recent years and led to the creation of a Rescue Task Force 
approach, where law enforcement officers enter the scene with EMS behind them and all 
responders continue through the building in a manner that allows for the highest possible safety 
for EMS while still triaging and treating patients as quickly as possible (Iselin & Smith, 2009; 
Jacobs, McSwain, Rotondo, Wade, Fabbri, Eastman, Butler, Sinclair & John, 2013; Atwater, 
2012). 
Aside from the first responder community, many other communities, such as schools, are 
also looking to improve their response to shootings. As such, school policies have changed to 
account for active shooters in all types of schools, which led to an increase in the number of 
video cameras, automatically locking doors, active shooter drills and trainings, and relationships 
with the local responding agencies (Fox & Savage 2009; Buerger & Buerger, 2010; Greenberg, 
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2007). Other articles (Jacobs, 2014; Johnson, Carlson, Murphy, Flory, Lankford & Wyllie, 2016; 
Fabbri, 2014; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011; McLaughlin, 2016) discuss the actions that civilians 
should take during a mass shooting. Although the initial focus was on a way to protect against 
workplace shootings, the whole community is now able to learn how to protect themselves 
through the creation of the Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE) course. 
CRASE courses instruct civilians to avoid, deny, and defend in order to escape an active shooter 
without harm (McLaughlin, 2016).  
Instead of a focus on all response aspects, some articles focus on the shooter and shared 
characteristics of mass shooters, such as Capellan and Gomez (2017) who considered the 
psychological profile of shooters as it related to the number of casualties that resulted from a 
shooting. They found that the most common characteristics of shooters are that they are white 
males who often have a history of mental illness, have not attended college, and are single or 
divorced (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Other studies considered the characteristics of shootings 
that relate to the risk an officer takes when responding to a shooting (Blair & Schweit, 2014). 
Blair and Schweit (2014) showed that 90% of the shootings included in their study were over 
before police arrived on scene. To broaden these and similar results beyond shootings, the United 
States Secret Service (2018) analyzed mass attacks, defined as the use of any weapon to kill or 
injure three or more people in a public place, and ways to improve threat assessment techniques 
and investigations. The USSS (2018) analyzed these attacks based on variables such as the type 
of public site, the weapon used, the amount of time each event took and the time of day it 
occurred at, the way the attack ended, and the resolution of the event. They found that most of 
these attacks occurred at businesses, were carried out with a firearm, ended within five minutes, 
occurred between the hours of 7am and 3pm, ended because the attacker either escaped the scene 
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or committed suicide, and were resolved either through suicide or an arrest that either took place 
at or near the scene of the shooting (USSS, 2018). 
Research Design 
To build on the current literature, a quasi-experimental design was proposed using an 
expected change in police response protocols after Columbine to provide a natural experiment, 
despite an inability to assign each incident to a protocol group. Although some cases after 
Columbine still followed a perimeter protocol, this was the basis of incident selection. However, 
the engagement protocol is still not used in every active shooter incident, preventing the use of a 
quasi-experimental design. Therefore, a cross-sectional comparative design was used as the cases 
are from different times and vary by protocol followed. The number of casualties was selected as 
the dependent variable because it shows the level of impact of a mass shooting event, is known 
or can be found for every mass shooting event, and varies due to many factors, such as the type 
of protocol followed and the police response time. 
Hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in the number of casualties resulting from mass 
shooting events where 1) police arrive on scene and set up a perimeter while waiting for tactical 
teams, such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), to arrive and engage the shooter and 2) 
those events where the first police officers to arrive on scene engage active shooters. 
Alternative Hypothesis: There are fewer total casualties resulting from mass shooting 
events where 1) police arrive on scene and set up a perimeter while waiting for tactical teams to 
arrive and engage the shooter and 2) those events where the first police officers to arrive on 
scene engage active shooters. 
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Case Selection: 
 Stanford University’s MSA database was used to identify cases for this study that 
occurred between August 1, 1966 and June 26, 2016, which are the first and last dates of the 
sample of shootings published by the MSA database. Stanford University’s database includes 
information related to the geography of the shooting and information about the shooter, such as 
veteran status, history of mental illness, and motive for the shooting. By using cases presented in 
the MSA database, this study can expand the information gathered from these cases by including 
information about the police response associated with each shooting. The only additional 
selection criteria was that the shooting was considered a mass shooting. This definition, 
established in the MSA database, requires at least a total of three people killed or physically 
injured as a result of the shooting (Stanford University Library, 2012). 
However, of the 335 potential cases only 186 were used because cases were eliminated if:  
1) The total number of casualties that were not family members of the shooter fell below 
three. Most family mass shootings take place in a residence of one or more family 
members and these are a different type of crime from stranger shootings. 
2) The shooting took place in a primary residence because there is a decreased chance of 
a person calling 9-1-1 quickly and police responding in time to impact the outcome of 
the shooting if it occurred in a private residence.  
3) The shooting had proven or suspected relation to gang violence. 
4) The shooting took place in two separate locations, defined as being more than one 
square mile apart because this reduces the chance of police responding to the scene 
and implementing a distinct protocol, as well as including two police response times 
for the different scenes.  
Linger Honors Thesis  10 
Independent Variable: Police Protocol 
The independent variable for this study is the police response protocol followed, which 
was coded as one of three categories: Perimeter, Engagement, or Not Applicable. Perimeter 
protocol is defined as police responding to the scene of the shooting and creating a perimeter 
while waiting for a tactical team, such as SWAT, to arrive, search for the shooter, and clear the 
scene. Engagement protocol is defined as the first police officers on scene began searching for or 
neutralized the shooter without the assistance of tactical units. Cases that were deemed to be not 
applicable included those where: the shooter had 1) escaped the scene, 2) committed suicide, or 
3) was neutralized prior to police arrival on scene and when police arrived, they were notified of 
these results and did not engage the shooter at the scene. 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Casualties 
The total number of casualties was defined as the total number of people killed or 
physically injured as a result of the shooting. This means that some of the casualties were not all 
impacted by bullets, but from broken glass or being trampled by those trying to escape the 
shooter as well. Additionally, the total casualty count represents those who were not family 
members of the shooter and were not casualties of a geographically different shooting. 
Other Variables: 
Additional variables were considered, including the action that resulted in the end of the 
shooting, the police response time, police engagement time, the shooting duration, and the 
number of people in the location of the shooting.  These variables were considered to determine 
if the difference in the number of casualties among shootings following different protocols were 
affected by a change in another factor. Additionally, these variables were included to determine 
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if they were a confounding variable for the impact of a given police response protocol on the 
number of casualties.
  The action resulting in the end of the shooting was defined as a direct action taken that 
stopped the shooting. These were categorized as police intervention, tactical team intervention, 
suicide, escape, or other. Police intervention ended the shooting if police arrived on scene and 
neutralized the shooter. Tactical team intervention occurred if SWAT or another tactical team  
was called to the scene in order to neutralize the shooter, regardless of whether or not they 
actually made contact with the shooter. Suicide ended the shooting if the shooter killed himself, 
regardless of whether or not police were already on scene. Escape occurred if the shooter left the 
scene and was not neutralized upon leaving the premises. Other was defined as any other action 
that stopped the shooting from continuing. Most frequently, the other category represented 
civilians who were able to neutralize the shooter. Approximately 49% of the 84 active shooter 
cases in the United States from 2000 to 2010 ended before the police arrived (Blair & 
Martaindale, 2013). The table below shows how these 84 ASEs ended. 
Action 
Ending 
Shooting Escaped 
Committed 
Suicide 
(Before 
Police 
Arrival) 
Subdued 
(Non-
Police) 
Committed 
Suicide 
(After 
Police 
Arrival) 
Subdued 
(Police) Killed 
Surrendered 
to Police 
Number 
of ASE 4 21 16 13 7 17 6 
Percent 
of ASE 4.76% 25% 19.05% 15.48% 8.34% 20.24% 7.14% 
 
The police response time was measured as the time between the first 9-1-1 call and police 
arrival on scene. Police response time was considered because 90% of shootings end before 
police arrive on scene (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Additionally, in two studies, one of 44 incidents 
between 1966 and 2001 and a second of 24 school shootings over five years, the average police 
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response time was 10 minutes and the average duration of all shooting types is 12 minutes, with 
many lasting between three and four minutes, which is the average duration of a school shooting 
(Smith & Delaney, 2013; Anklam, Kirby, Sharevski, and Dietz, 2015). However, Anklam et al. 
(2015) found that although police responses to these events have taken an average of five 
minutes, some responses have taken as long as 20 minutes. 
Police engagement time was measured as the time between police arrival on scene and 
entry into the building or other location of the shooting, with the intention of finding the shooter. 
This included the time it took police to stage, setup, and enter the shooting location or building. 
Police engagement time did not account for the police response time because if it was accounted 
for, then there would have been greater variation in the police engagement times due to a 
difference in police response times. These times typically vary among urban and rural police 
departments because of the availability of resources and proximity to most scenes of these 
departments. By counting the police response and engagement times as entirely separate 
variables, the amount of time a typical police officer will spend at the location of the shooting 
before entering the scene can be better understood.  
The shooting duration was measured as the time between the first and last shots fired by 
the shooter. Since many shootings end before police arrive on scene, this can be used to 
determine the extra time shooters have to target more victims (Blair & Schweit, 2014). 
The number of people in the location of the shooting was defined as the number of people 
in the same location as where the shooting occurred. This variable was used to determine the 
number of potential casualties that could have resulted from a shooting. Additionally, if a police 
protocol was followed in a case, the number of people in the location of the shooting in 
comparison to the number of casualties may provide information about evacuation by police. If 
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the shooting occurred in a building, the population was the number of people in the building and 
the vicinity at the time of the shooting. If the shooting occurred outside, then the population was 
determined to be the number of people estimated to be in the surrounding area, including nearby 
buildings. The term vicinity is defined as the exact building, and if the shooting occurred outside, 
the property on which the shooting occurred. The surrounding area is the area within one mile of 
the property where the shooting occurred. The location of the shooting is defined as the property 
on which the shooting occurred and spent bullets landed. 
Data Collection 
 All information about these variables were found through open source searches for 
information. These sources were primarily newspaper articles as only six After Action Reports, 
primarily provided by the Naval Postgraduate School, were available on the cases evaluated in 
this study.  
 Open source information was used if it was verified by three sources using the most 
recent articles and information available. If there was an estimated range of values, such as the 
number of people present at the time of the shooting, then the lowest number was used as the 
most consistent point of comparison. 
Similar methods were used in determining the action that ended a shooting. Specifically, 
if sources stated the shooter was arrested, other sources were sought out to validate when the 
shooter was apprehended. If this occurred after they left the vicinity of the shooting, then the 
shooter was considered to have escaped. Additionally, in situations where the shooter committed 
suicide before police arrived on scene, the police response was still recorded because in some of 
these situations, police responded and were unaware the shooter was dead, so they still followed 
a given protocol. 
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Challenges Encountered with Data Collection 
The sources used in Stanford University’s database were the first point of inquiry into 
determining values for the newly defined variables. After considering all the information 
provided by these sources, attempts were made to find additional information that would 
complete the dataset in news articles. Any information that was still not obtained received a mark 
of “unknown” in the given category. The inability to find information to fill all data points for 
each variable presented a challenge and limited the effectiveness of the analysis that can be 
performed. The most difficult variable to find sufficient data for was the police engagement time 
as it could only be found in 16 of 186 cases. This lack of information made it more difficult to 
determine if there is a true relationship between the length of police engagement times and the 
protocol followed by police. 
The main challenge with the sources used in this study was that although attempts were 
made to gain access to police reports, arrest records, court records, and incident descriptions 
written by police departments, this access was not available. As such, information contained in 
police reports or court records are unknown, but were sought out in order to determine the most 
accurate accounts of the shootings considered. This lack of information caused some data points 
to be left blank. For example, out of 186 cases, the police response times could only be 
determined in 58, the shooting duration could only be found in 56, and the police engagement 
time could only be determined in 16 of these cases. 
A third challenge of this study was determining the way each case should be classified. 
For example, if the shooter committed suicide before police arrived on scene, upon police 
arrival, or after the police arrived on scene, does that change the police protocol that was 
followed? If police found the shooter had committed suicide by the time they arrived on scene, 
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then these were categorized as suicide being the action that resulted in the end of the shooting
and a police protocol was not applicable. However, if the suicide occurred upon or after the 
police arrived on scene, then the end of the shooting was characterized as suicide, but the police 
protocol was considered either perimeter, if the body of the shooter was found hours later or by a 
SWAT team, or engagement, if the body was found by police officers within an hour of their 
arrival on scene.
  A part of the difficulty in categorizing the police response was the lack of specific 
information provided in the open source documents. Most frequently articles stated that police 
arrested, injured, or killed the shooter or that when police arrived on scene, the shooter was 
already dead. Most articles do not mention the time of the arrest, unless it specifically says the 
shooter surrendered to or had a shootout with the police. Most arrests actually occur after the 
shooting because the shooter had initially escaped the scene. Then questions that required 
consideration were: What counted as a shooter escaping the scene? and How is the protocol 
classified if the shooter was spotted by police as they were leaving the scene and were found or 
arrested as they were escaping? If a shooter escaped the scene and was not spotted or followed 
by police upon their escape, then the protocol followed was not applicable. However, if the 
shooter was followed while escaping the scene, then their escape was still considered as the 
reason the shooting ended, however, the police protocol followed was engagement protocol. 
These were some of the more surprising cases because they are not what would typically be 
considered active use of a protocol.
Analysis Methods
Another challenge was determining the classification of individual cases. Out of the 335
cases provided in the MSA database, there were only 62 which included any use of police
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protocols. There are few analysis methods that are considered reliable with only 62 cases, which 
presented an analysis challenge. 
To meet the analysis challenge various approaches were considered, included Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, which has two branches: crisp set and fuzzy set. The crisp set branch 
requires strictly looking at categories and determining if the case fits these categories or not. As 
all of the data presented in this study required at least three casualties, all of the cases would 
include a varying number of casualties, precluding crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
The second branch of Qualitative Comparative Analysis, fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis, allows for a distinction in the degree to which a case fits a specific category. Through 
this method, the data could be scaled and compared based on which protocol type was followed. 
However, this analysis method was abandoned due to a lack of complete information for 
a sufficient number of cases with variation among the police protocols. Once the case pool was 
cut down to only include cases with complete information for the type of police protocol used, 
total number of casualties, police response time, and shooting duration, there were 17 resulting 
cases. However, out of these cases, there were only two that included a perimeter protocol while 
the other 15 followed the engagement protocol. Although the two perimeter protocol cases had 
higher casualty counts, which would suggest there is a difference in the total number of 
casualties resulting from cases which follow perimeter protocol than cases which follow 
engagement protocol, this could not be confirmed with fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis.  
As a consequence of the inability to accurately apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis, 
t-tests and Pearson Correlation values were determined for data. In order to perform these 
analysis methods, data was separated into three groups of incidents: one group which followed 
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the engagement protocol, one group that followed the perimeter protocol, and one group which 
did not involve police protocols. The “Total Number of Casualties” was a ratio variable that 
allowed for a two-sample t-test. 
The protocol and casualty data were analyzed together using a two sample t-test in order 
to determine whether the resulting number of casualties from police following a perimeter 
protocol was statically significant compared to the number of casualties resulting from police 
following an engagement protocol. A second t-test was used to evaluate whether or not the 
difference in police response times were statistically significant in the total number of casualties 
that resulted from a shooting. Finally, a Pearson Correlation was conducted using information 
about the shooting duration and total number of casualties to determine if a relationship existed 
between these two variables. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics: 
There are many actions that can bring a shooting to an end. The ones considered in this 
study were that the shooter escaped, police arrived on scene and provided an intervention, 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Federal Bureau of Investigations agents, or other tactical 
units were on scene and provided an intervention, the shooter committed suicide, or another 
action led to the end of the shooting. In 68 cases (36.6%), the shooter escaped the scene. In 44 
cases (23.7%), police intervention ended the shooting. In 6 cases (3.2%), SWAT teams, FBI 
agents, or other tactical units were used to end the shooting. In 46 cases (24.7%), the shooter 
committed suicide. In 22 cases (11.8%), the shooting ended by some other intervention. 
In 51 cases (27.4%), police began an engagement protocol. In 11 cases (5.9%), police 
followed a perimeter protocol. In 124 cases (66.67%), the protocol police did or would have 
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followed was not applicable to the situation. This is either because the shooter committed 
suicide, escaped, or a person or people who were not police officers took action against the 
shooter. 
Variable Maximum Minimum Median Mean 
Shooting Duration 600 0.25 10 26.3 
Police Response Time 120 0 3.6 7.3 
Police Engagement Time 450 0 5 90.6 
Total Number of People in the 
Location of the Shooting 35000 5 152.5 1867.8 
Percent of People who Became 
Casualties 100 0.009 5.6 18.8 
Number of Fatalities 32 0 2 3.9 
Number of Physical Injuries 58 0 4 5.7 
Total Number of Casualties 70 3 6 9.6 
 
The number of people in the location of the shooting and the percent of people who 
became casualties were both intended to be used as control variables, but because data was not 
widely available for these variables, the circumstances around these data points did not make 
these variables viable control variables or comparative factors. However, data was available to 
increase an understanding of police response and engagement times. 
Most (81%) of the 58 cases in which police response times were known lasted 10 minutes 
or less. Police response times, police engagement times, and police response type helped to 
provide a full view of the response to the shooting. Although only 16 cases included information 
about the police engagement time, this length of time varied between 0 and 450 minutes, with 
most (56.25%) of these cases resulting in a police engagement time of 5 minutes or less. 
Perimeter Protocol  Engagement Protocol 
  Fatalities Injured Casualties    Fatalities Injured Casualties 
Maximum 21 24 40  Maximum 26 32 46 
Median 4 7 11  Median 3 3 6 
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Mean 5.9 8.7 14.6  Mean 4 5.45 9.45 
Minimum 0 0 3  Minimum 0 0 3 
 The median number of casualties resulting from the perimeter protocol (Median = 11, 
Mean = 14.6, SD = 12.8) was almost double the median number of casualties resulting from the 
engagement protocol (Median = 6, Mean = 9.5, SD = 9.6). While the perimeter protocol has a 
higher mean and median of total casualties, there were only 11 cases that followed perimeter 
protocol and 51 that followed engagement protocol, which may be due to the limited sample 
size. As such, the t-test was used to analyze this data in a similar manner that would account for 
the potential difference in sample sizes for each protocol type. 
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Statistical Tests: 
 
When the police response protocols were analyzed in relation to the total number of 
casualties, the t-test results produced a t-value of -1.53 and p-value of 0.132 when assuming 
equal variances, which was supported by the test of assumptions and the inability to reject equal 
variances. As such, this test showed the null hypothesis, the difference between the mean of the 
cases following the engagement protocol and the mean of cases following the perimeter protocol 
was zero, could not be rejected. This shows that there is not a statistically significant difference 
in the number of casualties resulting from the type of police response protocol that was followed.  
Additionally, there was not a statistically significant Pearson Correlation between the 
police response time and the total number of casualties, as the R was -0.0984 and the p-value 
was 0.4625. However, the relationship between the shooting duration and the total number of 
casualties, excluding an outlier with a shooting duration of 600 minutes, was considered 
statistically significant with a Pearson Correlation value of 0.5302 and a p-value of 0.0037.  
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Discussion 
 As the results of this study showed the impact of the shooting duration on the total 
number of casualties through the Pearson Correlation test, a way to decrease the number of 
casualties would be to decrease the shooting duration. One way of doing this is to improve police 
response times, but to also improve police engagement times. Shorter police engagement times 
were associated with the engagement response protocol while longer police engagement times 
were related to the perimeter response protocol. 
 Taking these results into account, the Las Vegas 2017 and Parkland 2018 shootings lasted 
10 minutes and 6 minutes, respectively, and resulted in casualty counts of at least 546 and 32, 
respectively (Los Angeles Times Staff, 2017; USSS, 2018; Fausset, Kovaleski, & Mazzei, 2018; 
Burch & Mazzei, 2018; Earl & Schallhorn, 2018; Almukhtar, Lai, Singhvi & Yourish, 2018). 
These shootings lasted longer than they could have because police did not engage the shooter 
immediately after arriving on the scene or locating the shooter. In the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, 
police had located the shooter seven minutes into the shooting, whereas in the 2018 Parkland 
shooting, police were on scene within two minutes (Los Angeles Times Staff, 2017; Flores et al., 
Total Number of Casualties 
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2018). Although it cannot be known exactly how many casualties these shootings would have 
resulted in if police had engaged the shooter earlier and shortened the shooting duration, the 
three and four minute differences between the time police were on scene and the shooting 
durations for these incidents are much greater than the 15 seconds in which one mass shooting in 
this dataset occurred.  
 Another important aspect in determining the total number of casualties is the number of 
people in a given area. However, the drawback to this variable is that it cannot be analyzed 
uniformly across different shootings. This was further supported in the comparison of a shooting 
that occurred in and around a building with five people, all of whom became casualties, 
compared to a shooting that occurred at a college with 35,000 people with only 3 people 
becoming victims. Even when these values are changed into a percentage to represent the 
number of people who became casualties, these values are influenced by the number of people in 
the location of the shooting and as such, cannot be compared in a standardized way.  
Policy Discussion 
According to the data, a shorter shooting duration would decrease the total number of 
casualties. This, together with a case by case analysis shows that following the engagement 
police response protocol would result in fewer total casualties than following the perimeter 
protocol and suggests that the engagement protocol should be instituted and followed by law 
enforcement. The cases where police followed perimeter protocol often resulted in a higher 
number of casualties than cases that followed engagement protocol. Examples of these cases are 
Columbine (1999), San Ysidro’s McDonald’s shooting (1984) and the Parkland shooting (2018). 
In each of these instances, the shooting was ongoing when police arrived on scene, created a 
perimeter and called in SWAT teams to neutralize the shooter. In the Columbine shooting, the 
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time between police arrival and SWAT entry directly resulted in the death of a teacher who 
slowly died from his wounds (Erickson, 2001). In the San Ysidro McDonald’s shooting, the 
police arrived 10 minutes into the shooting, but the shooting lasted 77 minutes and 40 of the 45 
people in and around the store became casualties (Liotta, 2015). In the Parkland shooting, police 
arrived on scene within two minutes and created a perimeter that the shooter escaped through 
after another four minutes (Los Angeles Times Staff, 2017; Flores et al., 2018). 
Looking Forward 
 Future studies should take into account the limitations of this study, such as an 
incomplete data set and little variation in type of police response protocol that was followed. A 
future study would consider more cases, ideally all mass shootings, determined by the definition 
of three or more people killed of physically injured, between 1966 with the University of Texas 
at Austin shooting and the present. It is particularly important to analyze more cases that 
followed the perimeter protocol, such as the 2017 Las Vegas and 2018 Parkland shootings, 
which would require the data set to be expanded beyond 2016. Finding the information that 
would complete an expanded data set would allow this study to provide a more complete 
understanding of the impacts the control variables had on the case outcomes. 
 An additional limitation of this study is that it did not account for the number of 
responding police officers who became a casualty of a shooting. By excluding this value, it is 
difficult to determine the extent of the risks responding officers will face when arriving on a 
scene and whether one protocol was more likely to cause responding officers to become 
casualties. 
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Conclusion 
Although the data does not directly support the differences in the effectiveness of police 
response protocols to reduce the total number of casualties, this difference is indirectly 
supported. Since the shooting duration significantly impacts the total number of casualties and 
the shooting duration can be shortened with police engagement occurring sooner, this supports 
the claim that the engagement police response protocol combined with short police response and 
engagement times will decrease the total number of casualties. This means that the engagement 
police response protocol, in conjunction with quick police response and engagement times, is 
more likely to produce fewer casualties during ASEs than the perimeter police response protocol. 
As such, the number of casualties resulting from ASEs can be reduced with more law 
enforcement agencies instituting, training, and responding in a capacity that follows the 
engagement police response protocol. 
Linger Honors Thesis 25 
References 
Almukhtar, S., Carlsen, A., Davis, K., Eligon, J., Fessenden, F., Griggs, T., & Yourish, K.
(2017, Oct. 2). Las Vegas shooting: Chaos at a concert and a frantic search at Mandalay 
Bay.  The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/02/us/mandalay-bay-vegas-shooting.html 
Almukhtar, S., Lai, K.K.R., Singhvi, A., & Yourish, K. (2018, Feb. 15). What happened inside 
the Florida school shooting. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/15/us/florida-school-shooting-map.html 
Anklam, C. III,  Kirby, A., Sharevski, F., and Dietz, J.E. (2015, May). Mitigating active shooter
impact; Analysis for policy options based on agent/computer based modeling. Journal of
Emergency Management, 13(3), 201-16. Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/J_Dietz/publication/272747940_Mitigating_Active_
Shooter_Impact_Analysis_for_Policy_Options_Based_on_AgentComputer_Based_Mode
ling/links/54ed62190cf27fbfd7724ca3.pdf 
Atwater, P.A. (2012). Force protection for fire fighters: Warm zone operations at paramilitary
style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment as a fire service core 
competency (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
Blair, J.P., & Martaindale, M.H. (2013). United States active shooter events from 2000 to 2010:
Training and equipment implications. Texas State University.
Blair, J.P., & Schweit, K.W. (2014). A study of active shooter incidents in the United States
between 2000 and 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/
file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view 
Blair, J.P., Nichols, T., Burns, D., & Curnutt, J. R. (2013). Active shooter: Events and response. 
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Bobko, J.P., & Kamin, R. (2015). Changing the paradigm of emergency response: The need for 
first-care providers. Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, 9(1), 18-24. 
Buerger, M.E., & Buerger, G.E. (2010, Sept. 1). Those terrible first few minutes: Revisiting 
active-shooter protocols for schools. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 79(9), 1-10. 
Burch, A.D.S. & Mazzei, P. (2018, Feb. 14). Death toll is at 17 and could rise in Florida school 
shooting. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/us/parkland-school-shooting.html 
Capellan, J.A. & Gomez, S.P. (2017, Oct. 24). Change and stability in offender, behaviours, and 
incident-level characteristics of mass public shootings in the United States, 1984-2015. 
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 15(1). doi: 10.1002/jip.1491 
Linger Honors Thesis 26 
Challis, D. (2010). Appropriate responses of campus security forces. Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice, 17(1), 169-183. Retrieved from 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol17/iss1/10 
Dusek, D. (2013). An ideal model for responding to active shooter incidents in schools 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas. 
Earl, J. & Schallhorn, K. (2018, Feb. 14). Florida school shooting among 10 deadliest in modern 
US history. Fox News. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/02/14/florida- 
school-shooting-among-10-deadliest-in-modern-us-history.html 
Ergenbright, C. E., & Hubbard, S. K. (2012). Defeating the active shooter: Applying facility 
upgrades in order to mitigate the effects of active shooters in high occupancy facilities 
(Unpublished master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
Erickson, W.H. (2001, May). The report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review 
Commission. Accessed February 27, 2017. Retrieved from 
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-
%20Governor's%20Commission%20Report.pdf 
Fabbri, W. P. (2014). The FBI’s view to improving survival in active shooter event. Journal of 
Emergency Medical Services. Retrieved from http://www.jems.com/articles/2014/09/fbi- 
s-view-improving-survival-active-sho.html?c=1 
Fausset, R., Kovaleski, S.F. & Mazzei, P. (2018, Feb. 16). On a day like any other at a Florida 
school, 6 minutes of death and chaos. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/stoneman-douglas-shooting.html 
Flores, R., Cuevas, M. & Chavez, N. (2018, Mar. 9). Radio errors caused confusion for police 
responding to Parkland shooting. Cable News Network. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/09/us/parkland-shooting-law-enforcement- 
response/index.html 
Fox, J. A., & Savage, J. (2009). Mass murder goes to college an examination of changes on 
college campuses following Virginia Tech. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(10), 1465- 
1485. 
Greenberg, S.F., PhD. (2007). Active shooters on college campuses: Conflicting advice, roles of 
the individual and first responder, and the need to maintain perspective. Disaster 
Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 1(S1), S57-S61. 
Gun Violence Archive. (n.d.). Methodology, in Gun Violence Archive. Retrieved from 
http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/methodology 
Hodgins, G., & Saliba, A. (2015, Mar.). Responding to 'active shooter' incidents in Australia. 
Australian Police Journal, 7(1), 34-41. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gene_Hodgins/publication/281212459_Responding 
Linger Honors Thesis 27 
_to_%27Active_Shooter%27_Incidents_in_Australia/links/55dbc0a608aeb38e8a8b902c/
Responding-to-Active-Shooter-Incidents-in-Australia.pdf 
Iselin, B., & Smith, E. R. (2009). Arlington County, VA, task force rethinks active shooter 
incident response. Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 34(12). Retrieved from 
http://www.jems.com/articles/print/volume-34/issue-12/major-incidents/arlington-
county-va-task-force.html 
Jacobs, L. (2014). The Hartford Consensus: How to maximize survivability in active shooter and 
intentional mass casualty events. World Journal of Surgery, 38(5), 1007-1008. doi:  
10.1007/s00268-014-2481-7 
Jacobs, L.M. MD, MPH, McSwain, N.E. Jr. MD, Rotondo, M.F. MD, Wade, D. MD, Fabbri, W. 
MD, Eastman, A.L. MD…Sinclair, J. (2013, Jun.). Improving survival from active 
shooter events: the Hartford Consensus. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 
74(6). Retrieved from 
http://journals.lww.com/jtrauma/fulltext/2013/06000/improving_survival_from_active_sh
ooter_events__.3.aspx 
Jeffrey, C. (2018, Feb. 15). Mass shootings in the U.S.: 346 mass shootings occurred in 2017.  
ABC 15 News. Retrieved from https://www.abc15.com/news/data/mass-shootings-in-the- 
u-s-over-270-mass-shootings-have-occurred-in-2017 
Johnson, O. N., Carlson, P., Murphy, B., Flory, D., Lankford, B., & Wyllie, D. (2016). Preparing 
civilians to survive an active shooter event. The Journal of Law Enforcement, 5(2). 
Kotora, J.G., Clancy, T., Manzon, L., Malik, V., Louden, R.J., & Merlin, M.A. (2014). Active 
shooter in the emergency department: A scenario-based training approach for healthcare 
workers. American Journal of Disaster Medicine, 9(1), 39-51. DOI:  
10.5055/ajdm.2014.0140. 
Lankford, A. (2015). Mass shooters in the USA, 1966–2010: Differences between attackers who 
live and die. Justice Quarterly, 32(2), 360-379. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2013.806675 
Liotta, P. (2015, Dec. 13). Daughter of 1984 McDonald’s gunman speaks out. Daily News. 
Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/daughter-1984-gunman-
speaks-article-1.2464531 
Los Angeles Times Staff. (2017, Oct. 4). Why did it take police so long to breach Las Vegas 
gunman’s room? Here’s a new timeline. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-las-vegas-shooting-live-updates-why-did-it-take-
police-so-long-to-1507174474-htmlstory.html 
Martínez, L. E. (2012). The police response to critical incidents in academic institutions. Journal 
of Police Crisis Negotiations, 12(1), 69-77.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/15332586.2012.646900 
Linger Honors Thesis 28 
Mass Shooting Tracker. (2013). Mass shooting tracker. Retrieved from 
https://www.massshootingtracker.org/ 
Mazer, J. P., Thompson, B., Cherry, J., Russell, M., Payne, H. J., Kirby, E. G., & Pfohl, W. 
(2015). Communication in the face of a school crisis: Examining the volume and content 
of social media mentions during active shooter incidents. Computers in Human Behavior, 
53, 238-248. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2015.06.040 
McLaughlin, E.C. (2016, Mar. 3). In active shooter situation, don’t just stand there… CNN. 
Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/us/active-shooter-crase- 
training/index.html 
Simmons, J. (2003). Rapid deployment as a response to an active shooter incident. Scribd.com. 
Accessed April 13, 2017. https://www.scribd.com/doc/16693309/Rapid-Deployment-as-
a-Response-to-an-Active-Shooter-Incident 
Smith, E.R. & Delaney, J.B. (2013, Dec. 1). Supporting paradigm change in EMS operational 
medical response to active shooter events. Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 38 
(12). Retrieved from http://www.jems.com/articles/print/volume-38/issue-
12/features/supporting-paradigm-change-in-ems-operational-medical-response-to-active-
shooter-events.html 
Stanford University Library. (2012). Mass shootings in America. Retrieved from 
https://library.stanford.edu/projects/mass-shootings-america 
United States Secret Service. (2018, Mar.). Mass attacks in public spaces – 2017. National  
Threat Assessment Center. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from https://
www.secretservice.gov/forms/USSS_NTAC-
Mass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf 
Yan, H., Park, M., & Simon, D. (2017, Oct. 7). Las Vegas shooting: Bodycam footage shows 
first response. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/us/las-vegas- 
shooting-investigation/index.html 
